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The alleged neural basis of empathic responses to 
artworks is only of marginal relevance for aesthetics and 
for cognitive theories of art, contrary to Gallese and 
Freedberg [1].  
The activity of the mirror neuron system (MNS) has been 
claimed to provide the neural underpinnings for several 
mental capacities, including, but not limited to, imitation, 
mindreading, language understanding and concept 
formation. According to Gallese and Freedberg [1], MNS or 
so-called ‘canonical’ neurons (or both) are crucially 
involved in our aesthetic appreciation as well. The claim 
concerns both the representational content and the vehicle 
of artworks. There are empathic responses to the 
representational content of artworks in which actions, 
objects and sensory interactions (e.g. human bodies being 
touched or wounded) are displayed; and responses to 
vehicles (e.g. paint on canvas, sculpted surfaces) in which 
the gestures of artists are readable from the traces they 
left (e.g. brushwork). The idea is presented as a major step 
forward in a landscape of aesthetic studies where the only 
cognitively relevant aspects of art are ‘disembodied’ ones, 
and as new support for neglected or forgotten studies in 
which empathic or bodily effects were taken to have a 
major role in aesthetic appreciation. 
The proposal is, however, open to the charge of 
irrelevance to the issues of aesthetic experience and of 
what constitutes artworks. Already the choice of artworks 
to be discussed, such as the Michelangelo, Goya, 
Caravaggio and Pollock quoted in ref. [1], is open to 
objection: all the works are both famous, so as to suggest 
and emphasize the importance of this issue for art; and 
mostly gory, so as better to nail the empathic point. 
Moreover, the examples are not used specifically. In the 
case of empathic responses to content, witnessing the 
corresponding nonartistic real-life scenes, say, of a man 
trying to escape from a mould of clay, of genital mutilation 
or of a finger probing an open wound, is expected to arouse 
relevantly similar responses as those provoked by the 
artistic examples. In the case of somatic responses to the 
vehicle, the perception of nonartistic handwriting (itself 
mentioned in ref. [1]) is documented to have the requested 
somatic effects that are so telling in the Pollock and 
Fontana examples. Activation of MNS or of canonical 
neurons is thus not sufficient for aesthetic appraisal or 
judgments that something is an artwork. Nor is such 
activation necessary. Purely conceptual artworks are 
unlikely to activate the requested motor responses; but 
artworks they are, and we can appraise them 
aesthetically. 
Two comments: 
(i) The question that is relevant to a theory of art is 
whether empathic response is constitutive of aesthetic 
response tout court. This is clearly an issue to be 
addressed before, and independently of, establishing the 
possible neural underpinnings of empathic response. 
(ii) In the case of responses to the vehicle, a promising 
avenue is open to empathic accounts, considering the 
nonmarginal corpus of drawings (see Box) and calligraphy 
in the whole of artistic production (as opposed to the 
relative marginality of Pollocks and Fontanas). 
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Box 1. Style production and recognition as a viable mid-level hypothesis in the cognitive study of art 
Still missing from the open field of the cognitive study of art are mid-level hypotheses that are both aesthetically specific (as opposed to 
general claims, e.g. about emotions) and functionally interfaced with psychological findings. Consider the notion of ‘drawing style’, central to 
art history and the philosophy of art. One crucial issue is whether the style of a draughtsman is inherited from other draughtsmen (see ref. [2] 
for a positive answer). Activation of the MNS might enable the observer of a drawing to retrieve some dynamic components of the gesture of 
the draughtsman. This in turn might influence the drawing acts of the observer (see ref. [3] for an experiment showing that the direction of the 
drawing movement can be recovered when perceiving a line). A productive mid-level hypothesis would be that drawing style relies on the 
dynamics of the hand of the draughtsman and that MNS subserves both style inheritance and recognition, by observers, of such influence 
between draughtsmen. This claim generates both new distinctions relevant for the philosophy of art and testable hypotheses for 
neuropsychology. One of them is that experience in drawing production improves the ability to detect influences between draughtsmen (see 
ref. [4] for related work on dancers). 
